Resistance Movements in the Tukulor Empire

Resistance movements were a dominant feature of political life in the Tukulor empire. They grew and developed with the empire, and remained with it until its fall. They were generally anti-Tukulor movements which were fundamentally different from revolts. A revolt might be defined as an expression of disloyalty or protest against an accepted, or once accepted, régime with a view to getting redress over certain grievances. A revolt usually fades out with the removal of the causes of discontent or might subside in the face of repressive measures taken against it by the authorities. Such a movement is really short-lived and limited in its objectives. The anti-Tukulor resistance that is being considered differed from revolts because of its nature and the permanence of its organisation.

The anti-Tukulor resistance movements were essentially a struggle of the various peoples concerned to hold what was their own in terms of socio-political and religious institutions, and the right of control over these, against an outside invader who sought to replace what was meaningful to the people with a new legal order in which the people would be dominated, or absorbed and used as instruments in the regulation of their own affairs. The emergence of the Tukulor empire was seen by these groups as a threat to their right to self-preservation. As will be shown in this paper, the anti-Tukulor resistance stoutly refused any concession of legitimacy to the Tukulor régime, which it sought to destroy.

Origins of Resistance

The emergence of the Tukulor empire between 1852 and 1864 marked the achievement of the all-embracing programme launched by the leader, Al-Hajj 'Umar b. Sa'id Tall. Already accepted by his
followers as the Khālifa of the Tijaniyya brotherhood in the Western Sudan, `Umar returned to Futa Toro in 1840. Later, he moved to Dyegounko in Futa Jallon where he established a zawiyā and taught his disciples, many of them already Muslims, Tijani doctrines. He did not introduce the Tijaniyya into this area. There is evidence that the brotherhood had spread into the Senegambia from the Moors even before `Umar went on his pilgrimage; but he was responsible for spreading it widely. `Umar taught his disciples the belief of the Tijaniyya in their own pre-eminence and moral superiority over all other Muslims. In doing this, he introduced a militancy that was generally unknown in the conduct of the other Tijani, even in North Africa. The militant nature of the movement he led has been explained as resulting partly from his contact with Uthman b. Fudi’s ideas and his long association with the latter’s son, Muhammad Bello in Sokoto. The tradition of fighting the jihād was still alive in Sokoto, and `Umar even participated in some of Muhammad Bello’s campaigns, during his long stay there.¹

`Umar enjoyed a great influence, and he was soon at the head of a radical movement which was dedicated to the establishment of a new politico-religious system in the Western Sudan. His activities marked him out as a revolutionary, and he was quickly so identified by the rulers of the various States in the Senegal valley, and later by the other States in the Western Sudan. One could distinguish between two types of States in the Western Sudan in pre-`Umar time, namely the Muslim and the non-Muslim. Among the Muslim States were Futa Toro, Futa Jallon and Masina, while the Bambara kingdoms of Ka’arta and Segu were the most notable in the non-Muslim group. In the States under Muslim rule, the people were mostly of the Qādiriyya brotherhood, practising the Maliki legal system. Both in the Senegambia and in Masina, the ruling dynasties had a long tradition for proselytising. Indeed, by the time `Umar launched his revolution, the Cissé dynasty in Masina was still waging wars against the neighbouring States, especially Segu, in an attempt to spread the influence of Islam and its own political rule. The Tukulor of Futa Toro, especially the torobe, were identified with similar exploits. `Umar himself had been educated in this tradition in Futa Toro. Moreover, the Tijaniyya brotherhood, of which `Umar became the head, had already been introduced into the Senegambia through the Moorish populations. This is to say that in the already islamised areas, `Umar’s preaching of the Tijaniyya brotherhood was not in itself strange: what was strange was the socio-political implications of the desired change.

RESISTANCE IN THE TUKULOR EMPIRE

Even in the non-Muslim States, Islamic evangelicalism was not new, and there already existed pockets of Muslims within them. The Muslim populations in these States included the nomadic Moors in Ka'artha and the commercial city of Sansanding in Segu. With 'Umar's movement, however, the non-Muslim rulers saw Islam as a new force seeking mainly to destroy the existing socio-political institutions to replace them by what they regarded as alien rule and institutions.

The First Phase.

The Tukulor revolution was a complex movement, and so was the resistance to it. Anti-Tukulor resistance movements could be divided into two main phases. The first took place during the process of creating the Tukulor empire; while the second resulted from the establishment of the empire itself. Hostility to 'Umar's movement came with the spread of his ideas and influence in the Senegambia. To the ruling groups 'Umar was a dangerous revolutionary whose activities should be curtailed. During his tour of places in the Senegambia between 1846 and 1847, definite moves were made to stop his activities. Hence the almamy of Futa Toro forbade him to enter his State and the almamy of Futa Jallon prevented him from settling again at Dyegoundo. This demonstrated hostility led to his flight (hijra) to Dinguiray in 1848. At the latter place, he pursued relentlessly his desire to establish the Tijaniyya brotherhood and, as a corollary, a new socio-political order in the area. Henceforth, opposition to his movement was also relentless.

As has been made clear, the ruling groups were Qādiriyya, who like 'Umar and his Tijaniyya followers, were strong in their conviction about the rightness of their cause. The theoretical aspect of the resistance was represented by the debate between the Tijaniyya and the Qādiriyya. The debate appears to have been spearheaded by the al-Bakka family in Timbuktu and the Gissé of Masina. To all, 'Umar preached the need to accept the more ascetic Tijaniyya brotherhood. He was dissatisfied with the state of Islam, and even accused some of the rulers of apostasy. The Qādiriyya, for their part, rejected the Tijaniyya claim to pre-eminence among Muslims. Ahmad al-Bakka, supported by the Cissé, denounced 'Umar as a heretic and an opportunist who only wanted to create an empire for himself. The arguments were theological and doctrinal. Each side was not concerned with establishing a logical point, but only a belief which the other side would accept or reject purely on conviction or conversion.1

As far as the settlement of the real issues was concerned, the debate achieved nothing, and it was futile as a means of establishing the one or the other as the truer Muslim. Subsequently, the struggle took a new form.

Regarding 'Umar's relations with the non-Muslim States, there were usually no such debates as existed between opposing Muslim groups. Like the other jihād leaders before him, 'Umar simply accepted the canonical injunction that it was a duty to convert the non-Muslim to Islam which, to the adherents, implied the establishment of a higher religion and culture. To the resistance leaders in these areas, however, 'Umar's movement was anathema both because the leaders (Tukulor) were regarded as foreign and the Islamic cosmology they were seeking to establish equally alien.

'Umar's launching of the military campaigns in Dinguiray in 1852 seemed inevitable if the non-Muslims were to be converted. It also marked the failure and end of the dialogue between him and the Qādiriyya Muslims. Henceforth, the resistance was characterised by military confrontations. During this first phase of the resistance, campaigns were fought from 1852 to 1864. As part of the resistance efforts, many of the ruling groups in the Senegambia allied with the French against 'Umar. Such an alliance was particularly welcome to the French who for their own reasons, were eager to stamp out 'Umar's influence. The first phase of the resistance was fought with varying fortunes for all concerned.

By 1864, the achievements of the resistance were still little. 'Umar's attempt to establish his empire over the Senegambia had been thwarted. But, fighting with greater and more coherent forces, and using more sophisticated weapons, he had succeeded in conquering the kingdoms of Ka'arta, Segu, Masina and the other pockets of States east of the Senegal river. It is necessary to point out, however, that even in these areas scattered territories remained unabsorbed in the emergent Tukulor empire. Such were the principalities in Beledugu, an area separating Ka'arta from Segu. In the conquered areas, 'Umar forcefully imposed Islam of the Tijaniyya brand, and established a political system that reflected this. But in spite of the establishment of the empire, the resistance movements, led by the recently ousted rulers, were unyielding. For them, Tukulor success was a temporary set-back from which they would soon recover. The determination to overthrow the Tukulor régime resulted in the opening of the second phase of the resistance.
The Second Phase.

This phase was characterised by a long, arduous and complex struggle that remained a sore point to the Tukulor régime and eventually contributed to its fall in 1803. No sooner had the Tukulor régime been established than the resistance groups in the various parts embarked upon a reorganisation of their forces. In some cases, members of the displaced ruling dynasties withdrew from their capitals and formed "governments-in-exile".¹

In Masina, anti-Tukulor resistance came within months of the establishment of the Tukulor régime. Here, members of the Cissé ruling family led by Ba Lobbo and Abdul Salam, in collaboration with the influential al-Bakkañ ruling family in Timbuktu, mounted military campaigns against 'Umar’s Tukulor forces. In these campaigns, Sidi Bakkañ N’Tieni led the Timbuktu forces. 'Umar was killed early in the resistance wars in 1864.² Led by these men, the resistance wars persisted with determination up to 1870 when 'Umar’s successor, Tijani, using his greater and better organised forces, recorded remarkable successes and disorganised the resistance forces. Henceforth, resistance wars became intermittent.³

In the Segu sector of the empire, anti-Tukulor resistance was led by members of the Diara family. At the time of the Tukulor conquest, the Segu Bambara had been led by Ali Witala who was killed in 1861. Thereafter, Bambara resistance came under Ali’s brother, Kegué Mari. From 1862-1870, he continued with tenacity, and with occasional successes, the Bambara struggle against the Tukulor régime. Under him, the Bambara not only maintained their position at Farako, but they recaptured from the Tukulor some of the villages formerly conquered by them. Many of these villages were around Segu-Sikoro, the Tukulor capital. Kegué Mari subsequently moved his headquarters to Touma, from where further resistance wars were launched in the direction of Sansanding and Segu. His activities became so intensified that by 1865, Ahmadu and his men in Segu

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¹. An example was the Segu case where the displaced Diara dynasty established a ‘government’ based at Farako, after withdrawing from their former seat at Segu Sikoro. Sansanding was also used as a base of ‘government’ organised by Fulani anti-Tukulor resistance. See, in Archives du Sénégal, Fonds de l’A.O.F., Dakar (ASAOF), I G 319, “État de Sansanding”, n.d.


were seized with panic at Segu-Sikoro. In January 1865, Kegué Mari’s forces occupied Toghou, a village south of Sansanding and the Tukolor army unsuccessfully tried to dislodge them from there. Indeed, the Tukolor army, led by Tierno Alassane, on this occasion lost much of their arms and ammunition, including one hundred and twenty barrels of gun-powder and many war drums. Bambara successes were at first so great that the Tukolor régime feared a direct attack on the capital by the end of 1865. They were however able to prevent direct Bambara attack on Segu-Sikoro up to the time Kegué Mari died in 1870.\(^1\) They were able to limit Bambara activities to outside Segu-Sikoro mainly because of reinforcements coming to the headquarters from several areas of the Tukolor empire. The net result of the violent resistance under Kegué Mari was to limit the area effectively under Tukolor rule and, in consequence, to increase the territory under their own “government-in-exile”.

Bambara resistance was led from 1870 to 1878 by Nyenenba. He operated mainly from Sambala, another village recaptured from the Tukolor régime near Touma. Under him, the resistance wars continued with varying fortunes; but without much change to the earlier picture. He died in 1878, to be replaced by Mamourou, who reigned for only seven days. Thereafter the leadership of the movement fell on Karamoko Diara (1878-1887) and Mari Diara who continued the anti-Tukolor campaigns until 1891 when he was killed by Captain Underberg, the French resident in Segu.\(^2\)

Although the Tukolor appear to have established a firm grip over Ka’arta by about 1857,\(^3\) what really happened was that opposition was only driven underground rather than removed. As in the other parts of the empire, anti-Tukolor resistance was led by members of the ousted Massassi dynasty. Mamady Kandia, the ruling fama, had died a prisoner of ’Umar. After him, Massassi leaders found refuge in the neighbouring Beledugu from where the resistance was continued. The new leader of the Massassi, Diringua Mori, operated a series of military campaigns against the Tukolor from his base in Beledugu up to 1869, when he died. After him, his brother, Boussefi, led the Bambara Massassi until his death in 1871. Before his death, the Massassi had recaptured from the Tukolor the towns of Farabougou and Lakmané; but the attempt on Diala, a district headquarters, had

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3. Between December 1856 and January 1857, ’Umar established some form of provincial administration in Ka’arta. He had then put his lieutenants in charge of the territorial units so that he could address himself to the French challenge in the Senegal valley.
failed. With Massassi occupation of Dianghirte district, he had put
the resistance in such a strong position that he could base the anti-
Tukulor operations in Ka’artu at a place renamed Guémoukoura
(= the new Guémou). Boussefi died in the battle against the Tukulor
over this town.¹ The campaigns for Guémoukoura however continued
until 1872 when Ahmadu’s Tukulor forces successfully dislodged the
Massassi from the base.²

Their set-back at Guémoukoura notwithstanding, the Massassi
Bambara continued their resistance in Ka’artu. They did not, for
instance, surrender to the Tukulor in Diafounou district which they
occupied until March 1877.³ By 1880, the leadership of the Massassi
resistance had fallen to Faliké, the traditional chief of Mouri in
Ka’artu.⁴ He appears to have led until the appearance of Bodian
during the French conquest.

The resistance in Beledugu began as early as 1865,⁵ and henceforth
widespread armed conflicts against the Tukulor footholds in the
area were reported until 1875.⁶ Generally, Beledugu remained an
unabsorbed part of the Tukulor empire, and in a sense resistance in
this area could be considered as a continuation of the first phase as
described above.

**Structure of Resistance**

From the above, it is evident that the resistance movements had
a common objective of overthrowing the Tukulor régime. But in
spite of this, the structure of the resistance differed from place to
place. The resistance appears to be a series of ill co-ordinated, inde-
dependent, and, in some cases, localised movements. This is not
surprising considering the circumstances under which the movements
grew and operated. For instance, in pre-Tukulor times, the political
structure of the Western Sudan was one that emphasised the separate
and independent existence of the component States. These States
also differed from one another in the political systems that they

¹ ASAOF, damaged sheet marked G 59/21, Kayes, 9/1/1890.
² ANSOM, Sénégal I 36d, “V. Vallière, Gouverneur du Sénégal à M. le
Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies”, Saint-Louis, 15/8/1871; Sénégal I 50d,
Moniteur de la Flotte, 15/6/1872; ASAOF, 1633/3, “Nouvelles du Fleuve, 1872”.
³ ASAOF, 15 G 131/1(5), “Le commandant du poste de Médine à M. le
⁴ Commandant J. Gallieni, *Voyage au Soudan français (Haut-Niger et
⁵ ASAOF, 1 G 32/5(22), “Mace à M. le Gouverneur”, Ségou, févr. 1865.
Mois de février 1875”; 15 G 109/7, “Cercle de Médine. Copie du registre po-
commercial et politique. Mois d’avril 1875”, also for May 1875.
operated. Thus, whereas in Ka’arta and Segu the Bambara were organised into kingdoms ruled by *fama*, in Masina the Cissé had established a Muslim theocracy in place of the former non-Muslim Ardo dynasty,¹ and Beledugu had developed into principalities operating somewhat as village democracies. The need to resist the Tukulor did not in itself destroy the political individualism of the States concerned. Neither did the common hostility to the Tukulor necessarily imply an attachment to, or sympathy for, the ideals of one another. In most cases, the resistance was led by men who would ordinarily be hostile, or at best be lukewarm to one another’s affairs. For example, the hostility between Masina and Segu had only been shelved, not removed. The ousted Cissé ruling group still believed in the necessity to spread Islam to Segu and bring the latter State under their control. Indeed they had earlier resisted ‘Umar in Segu partly because they considered that the latter was attempting to take over their sphere of influence.² The Diara of Segu were aware of this and could not therefore share fully Masina’s aspirations against the Tukulor. Similar situations as that existing between Segu and Masina could be found in the other parts of the Tukulor empire. In fact, initial Tukulor success owed a good deal to ‘Umar’s ingenuity in carefully exploiting the hostility between the States.

As has been pointed out, the leadership of the resistance movements was provided by the ousted dynasties. Naturally, traditional institutions became the foci of resistance organisation. In all known cases, leaders continued to bear their traditional titles and perform their traditional functions as if nothing had changed. For example, in Beledugu, the *dugutigi* and the *kafotigi* continued to be recognised as leaders of the people. The *kafo*³ became units of organisation for the anti-Tukulor resistance. Examples of *kafo* which became administrative units for the resistance were Koumi, Merkoyya and Damfa, the first being the strongest.⁴

The organisation of the resistance was similarly affected by the fact that although the interest in overthrowing the Tukulor was determined largely by identical considerations, such underlying considerations were usually not co-extensive in all cases. For instance,

³ The *kafo* was roughly a province or district comprising a few villages and towns known as *dugu*. The *kafotigi* was the head of such an agglomeration of towns and villages, and the *dugutigi* was the chief of the village or town. See ASAOF, 1 G 195/9, “Notice générale sur le Soudan”, L.t. Sagols, mai 1807, pp. 35-36.
in Futa Toro and the other Senegambian States, the objections to the Tukulor régime did not include its being Tukulor (that is being foreign as seen by others) and Islamic. It was rather a question of repulsing a group of people considered to be over-ambitious revolutionaries. On the other hand, in Ka’arta, Segu and Beledugu, the Tukulor régime was unwanted not only because the leaders had imposed Islam and a new cosmology on the people, but also because they were Tukulor, that is foreigners. To them, the Tukulor revolution was an invasion. This situation precluded the evolution of any closely-knit common organisation since the degree of involvement varied for the different groups.

The point should also be noted that even while the struggle for survival against the Tukulor régime was still going on, long-standing inter-group conflicts remained unsettled and in some cases battles were even still being fought. Events in Masina typified this situation clearly. Here the Cissé and the al-Bakkai of Timbuktu at first co-operated against the Tukulor; but later, while still unreconciled to the Tukulor, they resorted to fighting each other. In this case, a state of war subsisted partly because of Timbuktu’s attachment to its independence and its continued refusal to accept the authority of the Cissé dynasty. Elsewhere, as in Masina, internal fighting hampered efforts to organise a common front against the enemy.

It could be said that the structure of the resistance was determined also partly by the administrative system established by the Tukulor. The empire itself was unified only in the person and, after 1864, the image of ‘Umar. After the latter’s death in 1864, the empire was administered as three principal units corresponding largely to the three pre-Tukulor States of Ka’arta, Segu and Masina. The central authority became less effective than it had been before, and between the principal units lay ‘unabsorbed’ territories. Each Tukulor ruler adopted much of the administrative system already operated in his domain. The significance of the Tukulor administrative structure to the resistance movements was that each unit corresponded mainly to an area where a dynasty had been ousted. With time, Tukulor régime came to mean different things to different peoples. It became necessary, for example, for the Segu Bambara to see the Tukulor régime in terms of Ahmadu’s administration exclusively. This appears logical since their main concern was to regain control over Segu. The Tukulor were already ruling Segu as a separate unit and there seemed little reason why the ousted Diara dynasty, whose territories were limited only to Segu, should concern itself with the almost

independent Tukulor administrations in Ka’arta and Masina. Given this situation in all the parts of the empire, the resistance movements necessarily became sectionalised in their organisation and operations.

**TOOLS OF RESISTANCE**

In spite of the lack of unity in the organisation of the resistance movements, they adopted similar weapons in fighting the Tukulor. The resistance was in all cases characterised by violence, military and non-military. We have already mentioned some of the successes achieved by the resistance leaders in their military confrontations against the Tukulor régime. But in their prolonged fighting, the resistance movements often lost to the Tukulor because the latter almost invariably possessed better and greater quantities of arms. Thus, for example, the resistance forces in Masina continually lost to Tijani’s Tukulor régime partly because of their own internal division, but mainly because Tijani disposed of greater and better forces. His forces were more coherently organised and in 1868, they beat resistance forces led from Timbuktu by Sidi Bakkaï N’Tieni. Tukulor forces on this occasion were commanded by Tierno Salif. Later on in the same year, Alfa Suleyman led Tijani’s forces to dislodge the resistance groups from their strongholds in the villages of Poulié, Fakarbé and Wagnaka. In 1870 Tukulor forces took control of Kondala and Dimana from the resistance group led by Ba Lobbo. Also in 1876, the resistance was considerably weakened by the operations in the Djenné area, and in 1884 Timbuktu resistance forces were beaten at Sarébére.¹ This story of many set-backs was typical of the general situation throughout the empire.²

But in spite of the military advantage which the Tukulor had over the resistance forces, the latter were not broken. Military operations were sustained for a number of reasons. The scattered nature of the resistance was in a sense a disadvantage to the Tukulor forces. Since resistance was almost invariably mounted in several parts of the empire at the same time, Tukulor forces often found it difficult to cope with the situation adequately. Their successes were, for most of the time, necessarily limited in scope. They had to use their resources in several places at the same time and such victories as were recorded could only be against parts of the movements.

¹ **ASAOF, F G 122/1**, “Underberg, Ségou-Sikoro”, 10/10/1890, pp. 33-57.
Consequently defeats were never decisive and opportunities always existed for resistance forces to reorganise in preparation for further encounters.

The resistance was also sustained partly because, like the Tukulor, the leaders had supplies of arms and ammunition, notably from the French merchants in Senegal. Resistance leaders often sent emissaries to French agents in Senegal or to the trading posts along the Senegal river to buy arms and ammunition. As early as 1864, the Timbuktu resistance leaders had sent emissaries to the Governor of Senegal, Louis Faidherbe, asking for arms and ammunition to be used against the Tukulor. 1 The resistance leaders, like their Tukulor adversary, took care to cultivate friendly relations with the French in order to ensure supply of arms from them. Hence, in December 1875, the leaders of the Segou resistance sent envoys to the commandant of the French post at Medine and assured him of their friendship. When the French approached some of the resistance leaders in Beledugu with proposals for a treaty, the latter demanded quantities of arms and ammunition during the negotiations. Among other things they asked for double-barrel guns and revolvers, as well as swords and rounds of ammunition. 2 For several years when the French were unable to pursue their imperial ambitions in relation to the Tukulor empire actively, they gave tacit encouragement to the state of war in the Tukulor empire. By supplying arms to the two sides they kept the Tukulor busy fighting and therefore weak in relation to external forces. Regarding the resistance wars, Valière, then Governor of Senegal, declared:

"Dans l'intérêt de notre colonie, il n'est pas mauvais que le roi de Segou rencontre des difficultés et soit obligé de combattre pour être maître chez les populations du Soudan occidental. Il pourrait être dangereux le jour où il aurait réuni sous son autorité tous les pays compris entre le Sénégal et le Niger." 3

As a way of preventing their imperial rival, the Tukulor, from regaining firm control over the area under their authority, and at the same time to expand their commercial interests, the French supplied arms to all who wanted them. In this way, they maintained an appearance of friendship towards all, at same time as they were pursuing a policy aimed at rendering all the resistance wars a futile

exercise that was being prolonged to the eventual ruin of both sides and only to the satisfaction of the imperial ambitions of the French.

One might say that if the resistance had been limited to armed conflicts, the Tukulor might, after some years, have succeeded in breaking it. This would have been because, from time to time, some members of the Tukulor ruling group coordinated their military efforts against the resistance. The most constant co-operation endured between the Tukulor head, Ahmadu, and the emir of Diomboko in Ka‘arta, Basiru. It was their co-operation that resulted in the defeat of the resistance forces in their fortified camp at Guémoukoura in 1872.1 Other Tukulor rulers also joined forces against the resistance when it became a necessity to do so. This was the case when the anti-Ahmadu head of Ka‘arta, Muhammad Muntaga, and the pro-Ahmadu emir, Basiru, jointly waged war on resistance movements in the Diafounou district of Ka‘arta between 1875 and 1877.2 But even this limited type of co-operation does not appear to have been given by all the Tukulor rulers. There is so far no evidence of collaboration between Ahmadu (Segu) and Tijani (Masina). On the contrary, whenever they were engaged in power struggle (as they often were), one or the other of the Tukulor rulers exploited the resistance against the rival. For instance, between 1871 and 1872, Abibu and Moktar, with their allies, vitiated Ahmadu’s effort to suppress the resistance in Guémoukoura (Ka‘arta-Biné).3

But such co-operation as existed in the Tukulor camp triggered off reaction in the enemy camp. The modest successes achieved by the Tukulor led the resistance leaders to intensify their activities in other directions. To weaken Tukulor war efforts, they resorted to cutting off lines of communication between the various parts of the empire. During his visit to Segu, Mage reported on the closure of several routes within the empire. Almost throughout the life of the Tukulor empire communication between Ka‘arta and Segu was not free, as the routes were blocked by resistance activities in Beledugu. The Bambara resistance fighters also blockaded the routes between Nioro (Ka‘arta) and Segu.4 By this measure, the resistance move-

1. ASAOF, 13 G 33/3, “Nouvelles du Fleuve, 1872”.
ments prevented effective co-ordination between parts of the Tukulor empire, which they thus virtually truncated into bits. It was then possible for them to put under siege such parts of the empire as they wanted without fearing attacks from the other Tukulor rulers. In this way the state of war dragged on.

Resistance also took the form of attack on the Tukulor economy. Attempts were made to paralyse the commercial life of the empire by attacks on caravan routes. In Beledugu, the caravan routes were virtually closed, and Ahmadu had to provide armed escorts for some of the caravans. Some of the caravans trading between Segu and Futa Toro and other areas in the Senegambia were frequently waylaid and deprived of their wares. The resistance in Ka’arta was also expressed in this way. By this action, the trade of the empire was disrupted and the resources of the Tukulor deriving from the collection of tolls on traded goods reduced.

Apart from attacks on trade caravans, farms and livestock were often pillaged. This weapon was employed by the Tukulor also. It was a constant element of the resistance in various parts of the empire. Mage reported several incidents of pillaging on cattle and other property, and the continuation of this feature of the struggle is evident in subsequent reports. One consequence of the destruction and pillaging of farm products and livestock was frequent famine which weakened Tukulor efforts to suppress the resistance and contain their own internal problems.

One might note that pillaging and destruction of property might not have been limited to conscious resistance efforts. In the prolonged state of war, with the attendant mass movements of populations, it was inevitable that a large number of people would be displaced socially and economically. In such circumstances, the growth of banditry would be unavoidable since life must continue in spite of the fact that people have lost their normal means of livelihood. This would be a social phenomenon that resulted from the war situation. Needless to say the activities of bandits, whether Tukulor or from the resistance groups, would continue regardless of the real war aims and would be uncontrollable by the leaders of the warring sides. Indeed, it is imaginable that banditry would serve no other end but


its own, and would create problems for all concerned in the resistance struggle.

In addition to disrupting the empire's economy in this way, anti-Tukulor resistance also took the form of refusal to pay taxes and the seizure of tolls and duties normally payable to the Tukulor administration by trading groups like the Dyula. Deprived of revenues in this way, the Tukulor were compelled to resort to other measures to get funds. It became necessary sometimes for them to increase the amount of tributes and taxes collected from areas under their control. But the subject people did not often have the means of coping with increased taxation. Consequently taxes remained unpaid; and when the people felt oppressed by official exactions, revolts often resulted. For example, in the Tomboko region of Masina, regarded as the granary of the State, the people who had already submitted to Tijani's authority were driven into revolts through excessive taxation between 1870 and 1873. The people, becoming impoverished from excessive levies, refused further supplies of grains as their tribute to the administration. They renounced the leadership of the Tukulor emir, Dauda N’Guira, and chose one Ahmadu Abdul to lead them against the Tukulor. In this particular case, it took the Tukulor about three years of fighting to suppress the rebellion. Whenever situations like this occurred, although the Tukulor might succeed in re-establishing their authority, much needed funds and goods were nevertheless missed. Worse still, however, was the fact that such diversion of efforts inevitably sapped the resources of the Tukulor who consequently became less able to deal decisively with the menacing resistance movements.

As the struggle became protracted, the resistance movements shed off some of their individualism. They soon learnt to co-operate in their struggle against the Tukulor. For example, the Bambara of Segu and Ka’arta joined forces with the Beleri Bambara and the Mandingo populations in Beledugu. Early in 1884, while the Segu Bambara were still engaged in battles against Tukulor forces at Nyamina, Toubacoua and Konina, they received reinforcements from Beledugu. Consequently, Tukulor forces had to withdraw, and Beledugu was saved from attack. Similar co-operation between Masina and Segu resistance movements began as early as 1863. Shaikh al-Bakkaï, leader of the Kounta group in Timbuktu, also collaborated with resistance groups in Segu and Sansanding. Later on, the al-Bakkaï family became a nerve-centre of anti-Tukulor alliances.

Generally, co-operation between resistance groups contributed to the sustenance of their struggle against the Tukulor.

But as the struggle continued indefinitely, the resistance became a determinant in intra-Tukulor politics. As has been indicated, Tukulor leaders did not always co-operate with each other to suppress the resistance movements. They were most of the time plagued by a struggle for leadership of the empire, and while this continued, some of the ruling élite found it convenient to exploit the existence of resistance to their own advantage. For instance, between 1871 and 1873, during the struggle between Ahadu and his half brothers, Abibu and Moktar, the latter refused to co-operate in quelling the resistance in Ka’arta. They even appeared to have been happy with it. They often chose occasions when Ahadu was engaged in anti-resistance wars to launch attacks on him. This was partly why the struggle over resistance stronghold in Guémoukoura, already mentioned, lasted so long.1 In order to safeguard his own position within the empire, Ahadu sometimes had to abandon his campaigns against the resistance and concentrate on defeating his Tukulor rivals. His anti-resistance efforts were similarly frustrated between 1884 and 1885 when Muhammad Muntaga posed a serious challenge to his political authority in Ka’arta. Faced with a worse situation than that of 1871-1873, Ahadu once again had to invest all his energy on defeating Muntaga and his allies. On this occasion, Muntaga found the existence of resistance footholds in Beledugu a useful way of preventing Ahadu from leaving Segu for Ka’arta.2 While interest groups grew around the resistance movements within the empire itself, resistance leaders seized the opportunity to recoup their forces in continuation of the struggle.

The resistance leaders also exploited intra-Tukulor problems to their own advantage. They often intensified their campaigns whenever the Tukulor rulers were engulfed in civil wars. Between 1871 and 1873, they took advantage of Tukulor dissension to establish themselves in many places. Also in 1884-1885, they nearly succeeded in preventing Ahadu from crossing from Segu to Ka’arta to fight against Muntaga’s rebellion. While the 1884-1885 civil war was

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going on, Bambara resistance fighters in Beledugu cut off communication between Segu and Ka'arta and thereby made it difficult for Ahmadu to receive reinforcement from the former place.\(^1\) All these activities point to the fact that the resistance leaders were interested in the prolongation of intra-Tukulor struggle just as some of the Tukulor rulers themselves found the resistance a useful weapon to be used against their rivals.

**Outgrowths of Resistance**

As the resistance dragged on, it generated new socio-political developments which further complicated the situation. The growth of banditry has already been noted. But of greater significance was the emergence of soldiers of fortune and the development of territorial ambition among resistance fighters. With the prolonged fighting developed a class of professional soldiers who, though anti-Tukulor and therefore attached to the cause of the resistance, nonetheless had their own particular interests to satisfy and would serve any master who at any moment appeared to them to provide the best avenues for them to realize their ambitions. They therefore fought with different resistance groups at various periods. They even had their own corps of soldiers to fight as directed. In some cases, their military strength made it possible for them to play important rôles in the politics of the resistance. The resistance movements in Segu and Sansanding furnish us the most important examples of the rôles of soldiers of fortune in the resistance struggle.

In this area, resistance centred around the Diara family based at Farako and the Cissé who were interested in regaining control of the principality of Sansanding. The latter were supported militarily by the al-Bakkai of Timbuktu, who initially, also co-operated with the Diara leaders. Mabéré Kanou, a former captive, had been the leader of Segu Bambara anti-Tukulor resistance forces. He was sent to help the resistance in Sansanding in 1868. But while on this mission, the governor of Sansanding offered him the command of his own forces in addition to other rewards. He soon deserted his former master, Mari Diara of Segu, and transferred his services to the governor of Sansanding. Indeed, he worsened the situation by not stopping with his own desertion. He successfully appealed to the other army

chiefs, particularly N'To and Boliébougou, to join him in Sansanding. The decampment of these war chiefs naturally engendered hostilities between the two former allies—Bambara Segu and Sansanding. The two subsequently resorted to fighting each other and thereby dissipat-ed much energy that could have been directed against the Tukulor. Although the evidence is inconclusive, one may believe the story that Mari Diara, the first leader of Bambara Segu resistance, was killed in one of the skirmishes between Segu and Sansanding around 1870, and his property shared. In spite of Mari Diara’s assassination, however, the fighting between the erstwhile allies continued after Segu Bambara had found a new leader in Niamana Diara.

But dissension and civil war soon broke out within the Sansanding camp. N'To and Boliébougou soon felt dissatisfied with the activities of Mabéré Kanou and the governor. It was believed that discontent arose first over the sharing of booty of war. In the struggle, both N'To and Boliébougou withdrew with their soldiers from the service of Sansanding, and, in addition, attracted away some of Mabéré Kanou’s men. Operating purely in their own interests, they occupied several villages that were under the rule of Sansanding. Some of these were Sibla, Sanamadougou, Markala and Gomako in the area of Sana, and Niaro, Balibougou and Mikha in Niarodougou district. Thus, they acquired military and political authority over parts of Sansanding territories. In the face of renewed hostilities from Segu resistance leaders, both N'To and Boliébougou acquired greater importance in the politics of Sansanding. The governor of Sansanding who, with Mabéré Kanou, had earlier preferred to fight them, appeased them and brought about a rapprochement. N'To became the new head of the forces of Sansanding, and was also the chief of Marcadougou; but at the expense of Mabéré Kanou quitting Sansanding. It soon became clear that the settlement had merely changed the complexion of the struggle in Sansanding, not ended it. Thereafter, Mabéré Kanou tried to collaborate with the Bambara resistance group against Sansanding. In the continued struggle, neither side could win until they both lost to French imperialism in 1890. The careers of Mabéré Kanou, N'To and Boliébougou illustrate the emergence of a class of men within the resistance movements who were not just anti-Tukulor, but also power seekers with territorial ambitions.

But apart from the activities of these 'war lords,' other complications arose. Although there is need to await more evidence to be able to pronounce on the exact nature of the issues involved, it seems fairly clear that some of the resistance leaders themselves developed imperial ambitions in areas other than those that they controlled before the creation of the Tukulor empire. For instance, the al-Bakkai appeared not to be satisfied only with their rôle as the hub of anti-Tukulor alliances. In response to an appeal for aid in Sansanding, Shaikh al-Bakkai had sent about a hundred cavalry men there. But from later events, it appears that he also succeeded in persuading the leaders of the resistance in Sansanding to accept his nominees as governors while the war lasted. Shaikh al-Bakkai at first sent one of his sons, Rashid, accompanied by one Ali Aoudi, at the head of his cavalry in Sansanding. Rashid later acted as governor until he died in 1864. After Rashid, it became a regular practice to send governors from Timbuktu to Sansanding. Those sent were Ahmad (1864-1868?), Abdul Salam and Sidi b. al-Bakkai with whom the Bakkai rule in Sansanding appears to have ended. All along the nominal ruler of Sansanding was Labbo Cissé. The policy of estrangement against Segu pursued by Sansanding under the direction of al-Bakkai's men can hardly leave one in doubt about the territorial ambition of Timbuktu in the area. Among the activities of the Moorish governors in Sansanding was the buying over of army chiefs in the service of the Segu Bambara, hitherto an ally. These were Mabéré Kanou, N'To and Boliébougou whose activities had been discussed above.

In spite of the complications that bedevilled the resistance, the anti-Tukulor struggle continued. The Tukulor forces could not crush the resistance partly because they were at grips with their own crippling internal crises. Moreover, as their means of sustaining their forces became thin, these soldiers gave a lot of their attention to looting for profit and the search for spoils was often baneful to their proper mission.

Resistance and French Imperialism

It was in the circumstances described above that the resistance movements continued until the French began the drive for the realisation of their imperial ambition in the Western Sudan. The High Command to take charge of Upper-Senegal-Niger mission was established by decree towards the end of 1879, and by 1880, operations

1. ASAOF, 1 G 184, "Renseignements historiques [...]", pp. 49-44.
to connect the Senegal with the Niger by a rail route began with the Gallieni mission to Segu. Hitherto, the French had carefully avoided direct involvement in the resistance movements. They had preferred to supply arms to all concerned, and in that way encourage the wars to go on provided these did not hinder the flow of trade. The result was that both the resistance fighters and their Tukulor adversaries wasted themselves fighting unrewarding battles. This was what the French desired. But this strategy could no longer satisfy their goal of turning the Tukulor empire into a colony.

The change of strategy became evident in the Gallieni mission of 1880. Even before this time, the Tukulor rulers had realised that French penetration would be destructive to their interests; but they could do nothing against the French as they were harrowed by their many problems. The French fully recognised that an armed conflict with the Tukulor was inevitable if they were to achieve their objective.

Meanwhile they had to avoid this and maintain a veneer of friendship with the Tukulor empire. But their real strategy consisted in exploiting the resistance movements for their own purposes. It was to establish an understanding with the Bambara resistance leaders that Gallieni deliberately passed through Bambara territories on his way to Segu in 1880. The idea was to persuade the Bambara that the French, like they, were enemies of the Tukulor, and that it was necessary to join forces against the common enemy.¹ Bambara leaders, like the Tukulor, had however, suspected the imperialist ambition of the French. Moreover, they rightly disbelieved that the French could be friendly to them at the same time as they were still on a mission to Segu—an evidence of friendly relations between them and the Tukulor. The truth, of course, was that the French were against all parties to the resistance struggle. They were interested in using the Bambara to defeat the Tukulor by deceiving them with the idea of being allies. After the overthrow of the Tukulor, it was hoped, they would easily establish their rule over all, including the Bambara.

True, the Bambara needed allies in their struggle against the Tukulor. But they had no intention of accepting any other master. They regarded anybody attempting to undermine their independence as an ally of the Tukulor. Gallieni's double-faced policy put him in this light. Consequently, his party was pillaged at Dio in Beledugu while passing to Segu in May 1880.² He was also detained at Nango some forty kilometres from Segu until early 1881 by Ahmadu, head

¹. ASAOF, 1 G 50/20, "Gallieni, le chef de la mission du Haut-Niger, à M. le Gouverneur", Nango, 7/7/1880, p. 4.
². Gallieni, op. cit., p. 211.
of the Tukulor empire. Thus, this first French endeavour to use the resistance movements to their own advantage failed. But the French did not therefore abandon the strategy; rather they devoted attention to building confidence among the Bambara.

While Gallieni was detained at Nango, Colonel Borgnis-Desbordes took charge of the Niger mission. He was disdainful of the Tukulor empire and would rather be openly hostile to it in order to get the collaboration of the Bambara resistance fighters. He accepted the fact that the French desire to establish in the Western Sudan would lead to hostility with the Tukulor, and stressed the need to get into alliance with the Bambara and other resistance groups. By his activities, Borgnis-Desbordes provided the evidence of hostility to the Tukulor which the Bambara needed to trust the French. With the fact established that the French, like they, were anti-Tukulor, the Bambara began to feel that a common basis already existed for an anti-Tukulor alliance. They were strengthened in their conviction by French declarations that France was only preoccupied with commerce and would help restore the Bambara to their former States on condition that they would guarantee free circulation of trade after the fall of the Tukulor.

From 1882 to 1889, the resistance groups succumbed to French strategy and collaborated against the Tukulor régime. The only rub was that for them the French, for various reasons, were not always sufficiently militant in their activities against their common enemy. Some of the resistance leaders indeed became worried that the advantages of greater and superior arms which they had expected from their French alliance might not be attained. In 1884, for instance, the Segu Bambara resistance group was disappointed with the French who not only refused to employ their weapons and forces against Ahmadu, but restrained them from attacking him at Nyamina. On this occasion, some of them ignored the French and attacked Ahmadu.¹

Hope in the usefulness of the French as a means of toppling the Tukulor revived in the resistance leaders when Archinard began military campaigns against sections of the Tukulor empire in 1889. Henceforth, all the resistance groups actively joined the French in fighting to see the end of the Tukulor empire. By 1891, the latter had virtually been broken and the Bambara resistance leaders were hoping to be reinstated to their pre-Tukulor States—the idea that had driven them into alliance with the French. But they were disappointed. They realised too late that they had merely helped to install a more powerful master over themselves in place of the

Tukulor. It became clear for once to both the Tukulor and the resistance leaders that they had a common enemy in the French. Their desire to eliminate this enemy led to an unexpected realignment of forces that brought the erstwhile enemies on the same side. This alliance was without prejudice to their unresolved conflict. It seems that the idea was to eliminate the French first and settle the issues involved in the resistance later. But they both fell to French military superiority in 1893.

Throughout their long struggle against the Tukulor régime, the resistance leaders were consistent in their refusal to accord Tukulor rule any legitimacy. They were constant in their desire to regain their independence and political authority. Although their aim was the same, there were differences in their areas of activities. This fact was naturally reflected in the organisation of the resistance. But the disparate nature of their interest notwithstanding, the resistance groups managed to establish some co-operation against the Tukulor. However, some intra-resistance political complications developed and confused the situation. Partly because of the general socio-political situation in the Tukulor empire, the resistance struggle continued until the French came to exploit the situation to further their colonial interests. After the initial distrust shown by the resistance leaders, they were won over into a French alliance in the hope that by so doing they would destroy the Tukulor and regain their territories. The events of 1891 shattered their hopes. But rather than submit to the French, they changed their tactics, allied with the Tukulor and fought battles against the French. All along they remained faithful to their objective: even when they allied with the Tukulor, it was not because they were reconciled to them, but that for the moment they were eager to push out the French who had shown up as a greater and worse enemy of their independence than the Tukulor. However, they and the Tukulor were conquered by the French in part because the latter used better arms and ammunition and partly because they had been exhausted by the four decades of resistance wars. Thus, the resistance to the Tukulor régime ended only with the collapse of the empire. While it lasted, it contributed to the image of the Tukulor empire as an “empire combattant”.